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COMMENTARY 
BOILERPLATE TODAY: THE RISE 
OF MODULARITY AND THE 
WANING OF CONSENTt 
Margaret Jane Radin* 
Thanks to the vision of Omri Ben-Shahar and the excellence of the 
scholars contributing to this symposium, students of the law of commercial 
exchange transactions will now understand how important and interesting, 
and indeed exciting, boilerplate really is. The various presentations are so 
rich that my assigned task of commentary cannot approach an adequate 
summation. Instead of attempting such a task, therefore, I will take up a 
slightly different one. My commentary will relate some of the ideas pre­
sented in the symposium to two themes that I think are significant for the 
groundwork of contract today: the growing modularity of contracts and the 
waning of consent as the normative basis of legal enforcement. (The latter is 
also a major theme of my fellow commentator, Todd Rakoff, 1 whose contri­
butions in this field have been preeminent.) 
In conjunction with these two themes, I will touch upon the interplay of 
standardization and customization; the dialectic of rules and standards; the 
collapse of the distinction between the contract and the product it relates to; 
the problem of shoring up (or replacing?) the liberal notion of freedom of 
the will; and the allied issue of the political status of the regime of private 
ordering. 
I 
Henry Smith introduced the important topic of legal modularity, al­
though my focus on it is different from his.2 Modularity refers to the 
practice of building a whole by fastening together preexisting objects, 
analogous to construction with building blocks. Modularity became impor­
tant to physical architecture in the first part of the twentieth century and to 
t © 2005 by Margaret Jane Radin. Noncommercial copying of this work is licensed under 
the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License. To view a copy of this license, visit 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/. 
* 
William Benjamin Scott and Luna M. Scott Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B. 
1963, Stanford; M.F.A. 1965, Brandeis; J.D. 1976, University of Southern California. -Ed. 
I. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235 
(2006). 
2. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information F low, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1175 (2006). 
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the virtual architecture of computer science in the later twentieth century. 
Now modularity has become important for law. 
By legal modularity, I mean the practice of creating a legal document by 
selecting and cobbling together terms from a source compendium or from 
different sources. Some model statutes are modular to some extent because 
they set forth alternate provisions, building blocks from among which enact­
ing jurisdictions may choose. In contractual practice, firms have for a long 
time maintained form files that facilitate recombination of terms. Organiza­
tions such as the American Institute of Architects ("AIA") promulgate 
standardized contractual terms in the form of a compendium where the user 
may choose among various terms to deploy for a particular transaction. 
Boilerplate has Jong been associated with the idea of standardization. 
The often-debated question is, "Are standardized adhesion contracts good or 
bad?" That question-let me call it the standard question-is complicated 
enough. But once modularity is taken into account, the complex issue of 
standardization versus customization surfaces. Boilerplate can be used not 
just for standardization but, because terms can be used as building blocks, 
for customization. In fact as I will recount, a number of the articles in this 
symposium project a somewhat paradoxical quality by focusing more on the 
possibility of customization than on the standard topic of standardization. 
Standardization versus customization is a complex issue. The "versus" 
can mislead us. The two characterizations are not really opposed to each 
other. Instead, both apply to the same contracts when viewed with different 
levels of generality. Standardization serves customization and vice versa. 
Uniformity at one level facilitates customization at another. Uniform terms 
serve as building blocks in a customized document. But those uniform terms 
themselves may be composed of building-block clauses arranged in a cus­
tomized way. Likewise, the customized document that arranges the uniform 
terms in a particular way can be used in a uniform manner and can itself 
become a building block for a still larger particularized transaction. Uni­
formity at one level, the level of modularity, facilitates customization at the 
level further up, and the customization at that higher level can facilitate 
more uniformity at a still higher level. 
This symposium tracks the customized use of standardized clauses-in 
the AIA contracts mentioned by Kevin Davis in his article, 3 in the insurance 
contracts mentioned orally by Kyle Logue, and in many other instances. In 
some instances, recipients of standardized clauses can negotiate over them 
("You gave me clause 2.3.l ,  and I want clause 2.3.3") and thereby achieve a 
form of customization. As a number of writers pointed out, a standardized 
form can be customized in practice, informally and ad hoc, by drawing at­
tention to the beneficial terms for some recipients, forgiving harsh terms for 
some recipients, or both.4 
3. Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1075, 1078-79 (2006). 
4. I will consider this practice later. See infra text accompanying notes 16-23. 
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Modularity is greatly facilitated by digitization. The current era has be­
come an era of modularity. Boilerplate, and contract itself, is undergoing a 
sea change propelled by modularity, a sea change that has yet to be fully 
recognized and taken into account in legal thought. Recall that the origin of 
the term boilerplate involved a rigid, heavy metal object, the piece of metal 
produced by a linotype machine.5 Once this object was produced, recombi­
nation of the terms it embodied would be practically impossible. This was 
the first era of boilerplate. In the second era of boilerplate, modularity 
through recombination became possible. Firms maintained form files; by 
photocopying, then manually cutting and pasting, and then retyping, variant 
sets of terms were created. Today, in the third era of boilerplate, digitized 
repurposing---computer reproduction and recombination-is easier and 
cheaper by many orders of magnitude. Modularity now comes into play 
much more regularly and with much finer granularity. 
What are the implications of the sea change in modularity made possible 
by digitization? Here, preliminarily, are three: (1) Standardized clauses can 
be routinely cobbled together, even for small transactions; (2) Contracts, and 
the clauses constituting them, can be routinely copied and redeployed by 
firms other than the one promulgating them; and (3) Digital combination 
facilitates automated contracting. 
First, because various clauses can be routinely cobbled together, even 
for small transactions-because we can standardize modules at a much finer 
level of granularity-it is now possible to customize transactions that once 
had to be standardized. When buying a product online, a consumer could 
check a box to pay an extra seventy-eight cents to extend the warranty from 
one year to two, or an extra twenty-seven cents to have dispute resolution by 
litigation rather than arbitration. The determination of what the consumer 
should pay for each clause and the total of the selected clauses could be out­
sourced in real time to an actuarial intermediary, and the customized terms 
could be presented to the consumer in printable form very quickly. So far, 
this market has not materialized, although in the future it may; there's cer­
tainly an analogous market offline for extended warranties and service on 
big-ticket items, such as cars, and not-so-big ticket items, such as stereo sets 
and washing machines. If online contracts become customized in this way, 
there arise possible questions for normative theory that are intertwined with 
empirical questions: To what extent will firms include the most onerous pos­
sible clauses, which will be varied in the consumer's favor only by 
consumers with more wealth and more knowledge? And to what extent 
might this practice exacerbate the divide between haves and have-nots? 
Second, because digitized clauses can be routinely copied instantly and 
accurately anywhere in the world, it is possible for the learning effect that 
leads to widespread standardization to be accentuated. Once a clause has been 
tested in court, as Michelle Boardman argues, its legal effect is understood, 
5. James P. Nehf, Writing Contracts in the Client's Interest, 51 S.C. L. REV. 153. 158 n.9 
(1999). 
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and it becomes more valuable to other players in the market.
6 We may see 
the tendency toward widespread uniform use of successful clauses proceed 
much more pervasively and rapidly. In this case modularity could lead, at 
the level we would be interested in for policy determination, to more stan­
dardization rather than more customization. 
Third, modularity of digitized contracts facilitates automated contract­
ing. Suppose Firm A routinely buys a certain manufacturing input from 
several suppliers. Firm A could program its computer with a number of dif­
ferent sets of terms it would find acceptable for purchasing this input. The 
supply firms would program their computers with sets of terms they each 
would find acceptable for processing sales. When Firm A's automated as­
sembly line signals that more of the input is needed, Firm A's computer 
could search among different suppliers for one that offers at least one set of 
terms in common. With an automated "handshake," the two computers could 
make the deal, and the supplies would be sent on their way to Firm A. Of 
course, such a procedure would not be suitable for all transactions, but it 
would cut the cost of many of the more routine kind. And it would have the 
beneficial side effect of eliminating the battle of the forms for those transac­
tions. 
Modularity, whether in architecture, computer engineering, or law, raises 
an urgent question of interoperability. We contract theorists have not yet 
begun to address this kind of question, but we must do so. Standardization at 
one level permits customization at the next level, but customization does not 
function if the standardized modules are not interoperable. They just make 
the project break down: the building will be unusable, the computer program 
non-functional, the legal document inconsistent, confusing, and perhaps 
useless. The "Frankenstein" contract described by Choi and Gulati is an 
early example of what happens when interoperability is not a focus of atten­
tion. 7 
II 
Perhaps a somewhat deeper reflection on modularity involves the dialec­
tic of rules and standards. This dialectic entered the legal literature in the 
1970s, initiated by critical legal theorists and later adopted into mainstream 
discourse.8 Unfortunately, this terminology is confusing on a practical level 
and misleading on a philosophical level. It is practically confusing because 
when engineers and scientists speak of standards, they are referring to rigid 
parameters that must be implemented precisely; standards are the reason 
that light bulbs and plugs fit into their sockets. But that kind of rigid specifi-
6. Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 
MICH.L.REv.1105, 1114-16, 1117-18(2006). 
7. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1148 
(2006). 
8. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private I.Aw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 24, 57 (1992). 
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cation is what is meant by "rules" in the rules-and-standards parlance. The 
rules-and-standards rhetoric is also philosophically misleading, because 
rules and standards form a continuum based upon the degree of vagueness 
of a word or term, not a conceptual dichotomy.9 Yet because the rules-and­
standards parlance has become entrenched (standard?) in legal discourse, it 
seems useful to refer to it in the context of this symposium, as long as its 
limitations are kept in mind. 
It is a commonplace observation that both rules and standards have their 
efficiency pros and cons. Rules are rigid and uniform, so they may be know­
able, predictable, and administrable, but they are under- and over-inclusive 
with regard to their objective. Standards are discretionary and particularized, 
so they can be more accurate with regard to their objective, but they are less 
certain and administrable. Which type of directive will function more effi­
ciently seems quite dependent on surrounding circumstances. A number of 
writers in this symposium seem to be arguing for standards (that is, discre­
tionary implementation), as I will discuss shortly. On the other hand, Ronald 
Mann offers a nuanced argument that rules will function better than standards 
in the context of credit card regulation. w Other writers such as Ahdieh, 11 Ben­
Shahar and White,12 and Gilo and Porat13 argue that strict implementation of 
rules can serve a strategic function that is profit-maximizing for the promul­
gating firm. One such strategy, sometimes called the positivist kiss-off, is well 
known in jurisprudence; it is sometimes useful to claim that one's hands are 
tied by a rule that has previously been laid down.14 Those who have power in a 
situation might find their power increased by being able to deny holding it.15 
Now I come to what I consider a remarkable confluence. A number of the 
articles in this symposium explore the ramifications of treating boilerplate, 
considered as a rule-like object, as something that can be informally treated as 
a standard. Bebchuk and Posner argue that in some contexts, it is efficient for 
firms to promulgate rule-like boilerplate contracts that are covertly imple­
mented as standards.16 For example, the hotel that posts the 
rule-like checkout time of 12:00 noon can implement that directive instead as 
9. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 78 1 (1989). 
10. Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting" For Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899 (2006). 
11. Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (2006). 
12. Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufac­
turing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006). 
13. David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Con­
tracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive 
Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983 (2006). 
14. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); William Simon, The Ideology of 
Advocacy: Procedura/Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 39-91. 
15. For example, consider the faculty that enacts a rule stating that no faculty member may 
change a grade except for an obvious clerical error. 
16. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer 
Markets, 104 MICH. L. REv. 827 (2006). In an earlier article Clayton Gillette advanced a similar 
idea. See Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 679, 706. 
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a standard that would (if expressed explicitly) disallow checking out "unrea­
sonably late." This permits the hotel to be strict with some customers and 
lenient with others, depending upon what seems advantageous to its profit and 
reputation. In another example, Jason Johnston argues that under some cir­
cumstances, it is efficient for a firm to have strict rules that can be 
secretly relaxed for those who complain. 17 It is unclear to me that firms would 
find it useful to incentivize complainers, but perhaps there could be circum­
stances where that would be true. On the other hand, Clayton Gillette argues 
that it would often be useful for firms to enforce rules strictly against quarrel­
some or complaining customers and relax them for those who are cooperative 
or easy to deal with. 
18 
If we extend this type of argument, it might be the case that firms can 
maximize profit by promulgating onerous terms for poor people while rou­
tinely relaxing them for wealthier people who might buy more and become 
repeat customers. This circumstance would raise a normative-empirical ques­
tion that is similar to the one I noted earlier with respect to the possibility of 
paying extra for customization of clauses: Will widespread informal imple­
mentation of apparent rules as standards exacerbate wealth disparities? Even 
if so, should we tolerate the practice in the name of efficiency?19 Selective 
implementation of rules as standards poses the further issue of leaving en­
forcement to the discretion of private firms under circumstances in which 
patterns of discrimination, on the basis of race or other proscribed characteris­
tics, might not be easy to discern. If a firm routinely singles out white people 
to benefit by non-enforcement of its ostensibly strict rules, that practice might 
be difficult to remedy. Moreover, disturbing inequalities in practice may arise 
even if not specifically envisioned, if a firm finds it efficient to reward those 
who complain or request better treatment and it turns out that white men are 
more likely to pursue such requests. 
Even sticking to efficiency arguments, there is another side to the coin in 
considering boilerplate as a rule-like object that can be covertly implemented 
as a standard. In their article, Gilo and Porat argue that one hidden role of boi­
lerplate can be facilitation of rent-seeking by informal customization that is 
not socially beneficial.20 Boilerplate, say these writers, may give the appear­
ance of fair contract but may be implemented otherwise. "Beneficial 
boilerplate" may enable anticompetitive collusion.21 
In this context, I am reminded of Lon Fuller's concept of congruence, 
which he elaborated in his description of the Rule of Law.22 Congruence 
17. Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard­
Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 857 (2006). 
18. Gillette, supra note 16, at 705. 
19. These are familiar types of questions, of course, but still not easy to answer. Before 
trying to answer them, we have to realize where they are lurking, and that is my aim here. 
20. Gilo & Porat, supra note 13, at 1010. 
21. Id. 
22. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 8 1-90 (rev. ed. 1969). 
March 2006] Boilerplate Today 1229 
means that the law on the books must correspond well enough with the law 
as it is implemented in practice; otherwise we cannot know and follow the 
law, as we must be able to do if the Rule of Law is to flourish. When buyers 
receive confusing or contradictory terms, terms that are too complex to un­
derstand, terms that are written as rules but implemented selectively as 
standards, or terms that mean other than what they say, people cannot follow 
them and use them to order their affairs, and that is arguably problematic for 
their autonomy. There seems to be an ironic decision to be made between 
the amount of choice offered and the practical possibility of actually choos­
ing. Mann, for example, shows that choices involving credit cards are too 
multifarious and complex-too customized-for people to understand.23 
Would a rigid non-choice rule be better for autonomy because people would 
at least be able knowingly to say yes or no to it? 
III 
Many of the articles in this symposium assume the collapse of any dis­
tinction between the product, traditionally thought of as the object of 
exchange, on the one hand, and the contract, traditionally thought of as the 
agreement fixing the terms of the exchange, on the other. The collapse of the 
contract-product distinction is a trope that has become very prominent in 
contract theory, especially in economic analysis, and I refer to it in short­
hand as the contract becoming part of the product, or contract-as-product.24 
It collapses two conceptual categories-an object and a text referring to an 
object-into one amalgam that obliterates the distinction between text and 
object.25 If a cell phone contains a chip that will fail in one year and also 
comes with boilerplate exonerating the seller of liability for consequential 
damages, its market value is affected in exactly the same way by these two 
features; for economic purposes, they are both just features of the product. 
This idea was clearly stated by Lewis Kornhauser quite awhile ago,26 by Ar­
thur Leff even longer ago,27 and by now has become the dominant position 
of economic analysts. In this symposium, it is resolutely put forward by 
Douglas Baird,28 explicitly assumed by Bebchuk and Posner,29 and implicitly 
assumed by others. 
In this dominant economic view, contract terms no longer comprise a 
separate textual object or artifact that is the repository of independent free 
23. Mann, supra note IO. 
24. See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 
1125 (2000). 
25. See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and 
Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2002). 
26. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151 
(1976). 
27. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 144-5 1, 155 (1970). 
28. Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933 ,  933 (2006). 
29. Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 16, at 829. 
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wills coming together in exchange. Instead, the terms become part of the 
product, which is a unified set of disparate features: a battery, a forum­
selection clause, a micro-processor, and an anti-reverse-engineering clause. 
The contract-as-product view denies the traditional liberal normative under­
pinning of contract as instantiation of freedom of the will, or at least renders 
it problematic. Liberal will theory has become vestigial, at least in these 
quarters, as I will mention below. 
The collapse of contract into product has conceptually been in the offing 
for a long time; but it has really come to fruition now that both terms and 
products are digitized. Now we are presented with a bunch of digitized in­
formation, some of which is terms and some of which is functional features. 
The collapse is now literal, and not just conceptual. 
The collapse of terms into the product reaches even further fruition, per­
haps, with the advent of technological protection measures (TPMs). TPMs 
are technological self-help. For example, fancy copy protection that disables 
a program if the user tries to copy it can replace contractual terms that disal­
low copying. TPMs replace state enforcement with self-enforcement; they 
substitute an automatic "injunction," implemented by a private firm, for a 
remedy, implemented by the state, that must be argued for after an alleged 
breach.30 
Now, if one accepts the conceptual collapse of contract into product, one 
could think that TPMs are merely an acknowledgment that all terms are part 
of the product. When all terms are part of the product, it may seem firms 
should be allowed to choose whether to implement them as digitized con­
tractual terms or implement them as digitized TPMs. A TPM in this view 
seems like further "productization" of terms that were formerly contractual. 
But there's a significant issue lurking here, because TPMs look like self­
help, and uncurtailed self-help undermines social ordering because everyone 
can engage in self-help in response. When, in the liberal story, we exit the 
state of nature to implement a polity, we are supposed to renounce self-help, 
at least to a great extent, to escape the war of all against all. This backdrop 
of liberal theory may well be the primary reason why self-help has by and 
large been cautiously treated by legislatures and courts. Unlike machine­
implemented self-help, boilerplate that-at least theoretically-can come 
before a court before it is enforced is-at least theoretically---drafted in the 
shadow of the law. 
But what are the legal limits of self-help? This is a question that will 
now have to be investigated. Can the ideal of public ordering be salvaged by 
legislating regulatory limits on TPMs? If contract terms are now fully inte­
grated with products, should their limits be developed by thinking about the 
law regulating defective products rather than the law regulating unconscion­
able or otherwise defective contracts? The collapse of the distinction 
between contract and product, and particularly the advent of TPMs, seems 
30. See Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. INST. 
& THEORETICAL EcoN. I (2004). 
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to undermine even further the problematic distinction, central to traditional 
liberal thought, between public and private ordering.31 
IV 
The traditional picture of contract is the time-honored meeting of the 
minds. The traditional picture imagines two autonomous wills coming to­
gether to express their autonomy by binding themselves reciprocally to a 
bargain of exchange. The rhetoric of meeting of the minds has not disap­
peared. But, as Todd Rakoff says, the normative power of the picture is 
waning.32 The liberal theory of voluntary exchange transactions between 
autonomous individuals is now vestigial. The idea of voluntary willingness 
first decayed into consent, then into assent, then into the mere possibility or 
opportunity for assent, then to merely fictional assent, then to mere efficient 
rearrangement of entitlements without any consent or assent. 
In the parlance common in economic analysis, efficient rearrangement 
of entitlements without consent is known as a liability rule. In the original 
formulation by Calabresi and Melamed, liability rules were thought prob­
lematic for autonomy and were to be implemented only when property 
rules, because of market failures, were in practice even more problematic 
for autonomy.33 If we now accept a view in which firms can routinely 
change property-rule entitlements of contract recipients into liability rules 
by placing waivers of recipients' rights into form contracts, we have seri­
ously undermined the traditional normative underpinning of contract (and of 
much else).34 
Because of the historical importance of autonomy and consent, it is evi­
dent that many of us are not yet ready to give up the rhetoric. Consent seems 
obviously fictional in a great many transactions, however, and that is one 
reason I say that consent is vestigial. Consent is fictional when the terms are 
filed somewhere we cannot access, as in airline tariffs. Consent is fictional 
when almost all of us click on-screen boxes affirming that we have read and 
understood things we have not read and would not understand if we did. 
Consent is fictional on websites whose terms of service state that just by 
browsing the site, whether or not one ever clicks on the terms, one has 
agreed to whatever the terms say, now or as they may be changed in the fu­
ture. Consent is fictional when the contract ends, as one I saw recently did, 
with "By reading the above you have agreed to it." 
Not everyone is willing to give up on consent. Robert Hillman wants to 
rescue it. He proposes some legal and practical strategies for making it pos­
sible for recipients to read and understand the significance of boilerplate 
31. I will return to this topic below. 
32. Rakoff, supra note 1. 
33. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena­
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, 
CONTESTED COMMODITIES 16-45 (2001). 
34. See Radin, supra note 30. 
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terms before they become bound by them.35 For example, the idea of placing 
terms on a website for anyone who wishes to view them in advance seems 
easy to implement. Firms may have incentives to do this. Firms might write 
contracts that look reasonable and be happy to post them, hoping to enhance 
their reputation and also hoping the contract will proliferate and become a 
widespread standard, thereby enhancing its effectiveness. 
It is less clear, as Hillman ruefully realizes, that making terms more eas­
ily available will result in more people reading them. Hillman wants to 
shore up vestigial will theory when possible, although his caveats and wor­
ries show that it is an angst-ridden endeavor. In a similar vein, Michelle 
Boardman worries about notice and the ability of insurance policy recipients 
to understand what their policy covers; she too clings to will theory.36 Others 
in this symposium seem willing to bite the bullet and abandon will theory in 
favor of pervasive liability rules: if the market price is correct for the prod­
uct-cum-terms, it doesn't matter whether any given individual understands 
the features that we used to call contract terms.37 
If we accept the collapse of the terms into the product, is there any re­
maining role for liberal will theory? It is attractive to try to retain liberal will 
theory somehow, and I am thus sympathetic to Hillman's project, because it 
is still our leading candidate for what justifies rearranging entitlements 
among private parties. 
If we want to rely on efficiency to justify rearranging entitlements with­
out consent yet avoid abandoning a commitment to autonomy, we could try 
saying that there is autonomous bargaining over the total product­
consisting of the concatenation of terms and functional features--or at least 
consent to the attributes of the total product. We can imagine that the user is 
bargaining over, or at least consenting to, the battery plus forum-selection 
clause plus microprocessor plus anti-reverse-engineering clause, etc. But 
this picture does not seem normatively promising. What determines the will­
ingness to pay for the total product, and hence the price of the product, is 
not the consent of each individual, as in will theory. Instead, it is some other 
kind of thing, having to do with how a market functions in the aggregate. 
We do not "knowingly" accept a total product in the sense of "knowing" 
how the battery will function or how the forum-selection clause will func­
tion. The buyer does not knowingly accept the whole product in the way that 
liberal will theory postulates in order to justify the transfer of entitlement by 
the buyer's free will. Even if we think that something about an aggregation 
of individuals and their knowledge does determine willingness to buy the 
product at what turns out to be the market price, that is, a demand curve, 
that something does not map onto traditional will theory. Traditional will 
theory is individualistic in a way that economic analysis is not. The aggre­
gate analysis does not support a notion that in the process by which the 
35. Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of £­
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 845-49 (2006). 
36. Boardman, supra note 6, at 1115, 1117-18. 
37. Baird supra note 28; Bebchuk & Posner supra note 16. 
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market price of a product is determined, individuals are each expressing 
their free will by means of voluntary interaction or even by means of a rela­
tively robust and not merely rhetorical understanding of consent. 
v 
The liberal public-private distinction has been central to the notion of 
public enforcement of private ordering. Hence, it is central to the traditional 
notion of contract. Private ordering has been thought of as the expression of 
free will privately, but in the context of a juridical infrastructure. The juridi­
cal infrastructure is necessary to set out the limits of contract-delineate 
what is off the bargaining table, such as baby-selling, contracts in restraint 
of trade, murder for hire-and also to police transactions for coercion and 
fraud. These limits, I would say, are necessary to the idea of private order­
ing. 
The legal realists deconstructed the public-private distinction by show­
ing that contract, which is supposed to be private, cannot exist without its 
public infrastructure, its infrastructure of legality. The public-private dis­
tinction may have been deconstructed enough that it is no longer a workable 
conceptual distinction. But I still think a pragmatic version of it has re­
mained necessary in order to understand and justify the legal institution of 
contract and the notion of private ordering in the context of the democratic 
state and the Rule of Law. Certain functions belong primarily to the state, 
and certain functions belong primarily to individuals to accomplish without 
immediacy of state involvement, even though the state supports the back­
ground infrastructure. There are borderline cases in which we can't tell 
whether to call an interaction public or private, but the borderline cases must 
not overwhelm the system. If the notion of private ordering is to remain vi­
able, then the pragmatic version of the public-private distinction must 
remain viable. 
Here I think certain conceptual moves made by some participants in this 
symposium tend to undermine the pragmatic public-private distinction and 
hence to weaken the normative justification of private ordering within the 
Rule of Law. Contract is moving toward property; contract is moving toward 
legislation by trade groups; contract is moving toward productization featur­
ing machine-implemented self-enforcement. All of these conceptual changes 
signify moves that previously belonged to the sovereign infrastructure but 
are now going over to the firm. For example, in IP law, contract is moving 
toward property because mass-market end-user licenses are superseding 
whatever user rights are granted by the federal IP regimes; and those back­
ground regimes become in practice irrelevant to the extent that the user's 
property rights are determined by the mass-market contract and not by the 
legislated background law.38 The law of the legislature is being superseded 
by the law of the firm. Legislative rules are tied up with democracy in a way 
38. See Radin, supra note 25. The acronym I coined for this situation, "EPSER" for "Effica­
cious Promulgated Superseding Entitlement Regime," will probably not become a household word. 
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that rules promulgated by firms are not, even though democracy in practice, 
as the positive political theorists show us, is non-ideal. I think we do not yet 
have a satisfactory way of theorizing this metamorphosis. The only thing I 
want to say here is that this tendency to migrate sovereign functions to firms 
puts pressure on the last vestiges of liberal will theory. Boilerplate in the 
contemporary context is clearly raising the question; we have not yet talked 
about the kinds of principles we ought to use to think further about it. 
